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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

N0. 46762-2019

)

V.

)

Ada County Case No.

)

CR01-18—47648

)

TRAVIS DARREL TENNANT,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

IS SUE

Has Tennant

failed to

show

the district court abused

its

sentencing discretion?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 27,
ran

someone over

driving into

201 8, Travis Darrel Tennant stole a 2004 Dodge

in the process.

(PSI, p.3.)

He

oncoming trafﬁc, and running red

activated their lights. (PSI, p.3.) Tennant

“drove recklessly, passing 0n double solid

lights.” (PSI, p.3.)

“ﬂed

Ram pickup and nearly

at a ‘high rate

lines,

The police chased Tennant and

of speed.’” (PSI,

p.3.)

For the next

hour, Tennant “was observed speeding, driving on sidewalks, speeding through parking

lots,

driving over curbs, driving across farm ﬁelds and through sage brush, driving through Falcon Crest

Golf Course and vacant

lots,

and

striking a patrol car.”

Tennant’s chaotic and

(PSI, p3.)

dangerous drive ruined the stolen truck. (PSI, p.3.)

The

state

charged Tennant With felony eluding a police ofﬁcer, aggravated battery 0n a

police ofﬁcer, aggravated assault 0n a police ofﬁcer, and grand theft. (R., pp.25-27.) Pursuant to

a plea agreement, Tennant pled guilty to felony eluding a police ofﬁcer and grand

40.)

The

district court

theft. (R.,

pp.29-

sentenced Tennant t0 an aggregate uniﬁed term 0f four years ﬁxed and six

years indeterminate. (R., p.46.) Tennant timely appealed. (R., pp.52-54.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When

evaluating whether a sentence

is

excessive, the court considers the entire length of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.

State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d

621, 628 (2016); State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).

ARGUMENT
Tennant Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Abused

The district court did not abuse its

discretion when

of four years ﬁxed and six years indeterminate.

It is

it

presumed that the ﬁxed portion ofthe sentence

conﬁnement. State

P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence

is

(citations omitted).

it is

To

Sentencing Discretion

imposed an aggregate uniﬁed sentence

will be the defendant’s probable term of

of demonstrating that

Its

V. Oliver,

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

a clear abuse of discretion. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

carry this burden the appellant must

any reasonable View 0f the

facts.

Li.

show

the sentence

628

8,

368 P.3d

is

excessive under

at

A

sentence

is

reasonable if

it

appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective 0f

protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

Li The

retribution.

differing weights

all

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them

district court

when deciding upon the

sentence. Li. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State V. Moore, 131

Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding

did not abuse

district court

its

discretion in

concluding that the objectives 0f punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the

need for

rehabilitation).

“In deference to the

trial

judge, this Court will not substitute

a reasonable sentence Where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

at

628 (quoting

ﬁxed within
discretion

by

m,

146 Idaho

the limits prescribed

the trial court.”

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

at

by

its

8,

View of

368 P.3d

Furthermore, “[a] sentence

the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse 0f

103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324

Li. (quoting State V. Nice,

(1982)).

Tennant’s sentence ﬁts within the statutory
eluding a police ofﬁcer

is

ﬁve years

ﬂ

I.C.

limits.

The

§49-1404; LC.

statutory

§

for grand theft

district court

is

fourteen years

ﬂ

I.C. § 18-2407(b)(1);

imposed a sentence of four years ﬁxed and

The

district court

most weight
indicated,

E

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

considered

t0 the protection

all

LC.

§ 18-2408(2)(a),

and the

six years indeterminate (R., p.46).

at 8,

368 P.3d

excessive under any

is

He

at 628.

(TL, p.17, L.13

—

p.22, L.18.)

As

Tennant engaged in reckless criminal behavior that risked the

—

statutory

cannot d0

so.

0f the necessary sentencing factors but properly gave the

0f society.

innocent people. (TL, p.17, L.19

The

(R., p.46).

That leaves Tennant With the burden of proving that his sentence
reasonable View of the facts.

for felony

18-112, and the district court

imposed a sentence 0f four years ﬁxed and one year indeterminate

maximum

maximum

p.18, L.22.)

And

this

was not

the district court

lives

his ﬁrst rodeo.

of numerous

Tennant has a

lengthy criminal history that mirrors his behavior in this case, including convictions for burglary,
theft, reckless driving, and eluding a police officer. (PSI, pp.4-7.)
Tennant suggests that the district court did not properly consider his mental health as
required by I.C. § 19-2523. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.) The record says otherwise. The district
court emphasized that the mental health evaluation supported the sentence imposed: “Dr.
Johnston’s [mental health] evaluation of the defendant only goes to support that conclusion.” (Tr.,
p.19, Ls.25 – p.20, L.2.) Specifically, Dr. Johnston concluded that Tennant “would pose a high
risk to re-offend within the next year as compared to other offenders.” (PSI, p.54.) The district
court cited that conclusion to support its sentencing decision and quoted extensively from Dr.
Johnston’s report at the sentencing hearing. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-18.)
Similarly, the record belies Tennant’s claim that the district court did not even consider
giving Tennant probation so that Tennant could receive treatment. (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) The
district court acknowledged Dr. Johnston found Tennant “is at least moderately amenable to
treatment” but went on to explain, using Dr. Johnston’s report, why “this case [was] a prison case.”
(Tr., p.20, Ls.2-25.) The district court quoted from Dr. Johnston’s report:
The examinee’s most relevant issues and dynamic risk factors that
contribute to his risk to reoffend would be antisocial personality
characteristics, problems with impulse control, poor insight,
insufficient fear of consequences, callousness, beliefs that support
the manipulation of others, attitudes that support an antisocial
lifestyle, propensity towards rule breaking, poor problem solving
skills, unresponsiveness to treatment, and a history of difficulty
complying with the conditions of probation/parole.
(Tr., p.20, Ls.9-18 (emphases added).) The district court also found “the fact that [Tennant] was
on parole when these [crimes] happened . . . is something that weighs very heavily against the
idea that probation is appropriate.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.5-19.) The district court thus considered and
reasonably rejected Tennant’s request for probation.
4

In sum, the district court acted reasonably

when

of four years ﬁxed with six years indeterminate

it

imposed an aggregate uniﬁed sentence

after considering all

0f the relevant

factors,

including Tennant’s mental health and the possibility ofplacing Tennant 0n probation so he could
receive treatment. Thus, the district court did not abuse

its

sentencing discretion.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s judgment

0f conviction.

DATED this 7th day of October, 2019.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IHEREBY CERTIFY that I have this
copy of the foregoing
File and Serve:

7th day of October, 2019, served a true and correct

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

t0 the attorney listed

KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

below by means 0f iCourt

